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NOTE
IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ACTION FOR
CHILDREN'S TELEVISION v. FCC IMPROPERLY
DELINEATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
OF BROADCAST INDECENCY REGULATION
Freedom of expression is a fundamental right protected by the First
Amendment to the Constitution.' The scope of this right may be limited,
however, when the Government finds regulation necessary for the furtherance of a compelling state interest.2 According to the United States
Supreme Court, the state maintains a compelling interest in the physical and
3
psychological well-being of children.
With greater urgency and increasing frequency,4 parents, physicians, journalists, and congressmen claim that children should be protected from a ris1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.
... ). See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.2, .5-.6 (4th ed. 1991).
2. E.g., Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1852 (1992).
3. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (recognizing as "evident beyond
the need for elaboration" a state's compelling interest in the physical and psychological wellbeing of minors); Globe Newspaper Co. v, Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (compelling state interest in physical and psychological well-being of children does not permit
mandatory exclusion of public from trials involving criminal sexual offenses against minors);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (recognizing the need to protect children
from indecent broadcasts); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (state law banning
distribution of indecent film and printed material to minors falls within a "[s]tate's constitutional power to regulate" the "well-being of its children"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 168 (1944) (explaining that children's interests are compelling, in part, because the successful continuation of a democratic society depends "upon the healthy, well-rounded growth
of young people into full maturity as citizens").
4. See Claudia Puig, Three L.A. Stations Bar Condom Ad, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1991, at
F1 (discussing station managers' conundrum in deciding not to air condom ads following the
recent revelation that L.A. Laker's basketball star Magic Johnson has contracted HIV); Herbert Rotfeld, Why don't we see many condom ads? Because we don't want to, CHI. TRIB.,
December 16, 1991, at 23 ("Young people need to be informed about high-risk behaviors, but
parents object to the radio or TV broadcasting sex or drug-related messages to their children
...[because it is] seen by many as encouraging promiscuity and drug abuse."); A Weekly
Checklist of Major Issues, NAT'L J., July 21, 1991, at 1786 (discussing the twenty-four-hour
ban on indecency); Nathan Cobb, Prime Time Sex, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Apr. 30, 1989, at

20.
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ing tide of violent and sexually explicit broadcasts.5 Escalating competition
within the media marketplace, as well as a common belief that such shows
attract greater audiences, are, in part, responsible for a shift in broadcast
programming.6 Although legislators and agencies make attempts to protect
children through their support of broadcast content standards," these measures consistently fail to overcome concerns that such regulation impermissibly infringes upon the media's First Amendment rights.'
5. See Laura S. Stepp, Being Blunt About the Birds and Bees, WASH. POST, Dec. 23,
1991, at Al. The article discusses a mother's concern about the shift in broadcast mores and
how her attempts to restrict her daughters' television viewing, "particularly daytime soap operas," were repeatedly unsuccessful. Id. at A10. The article also notes that while Lucy and
Ricky Ricardo of the TV show "I Love Lucy" "slept in separate twin beds even though they
were married," today's prime-time television mother, Roseanne, "takes her teenage daughter
to get a prescription for birth control pills." Id.; see 1 NATIONAL INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH,
TELEVISION AND BEHAVIOR: TEN YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE EIGHTIES (1982), cited in Henry J. Uscinski, Comment, Deregulating Commercial
Television: Will the Marketplace Watch Out for Children?, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 141, 146 n.28
(1984). The study "found that children's television programming fosters poor nutrition [and]
encourages violence and aggression." Id.; see also McCalls: Sex on Television May be Harmful
to Children, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 10, 1991 (quoting Thomas Radecki, M.D., a psychiatrist
and research director for the National Coalition on Television Violence who maintains that
"'[t]he destructive effect of degrading sexual themes' on television contributes to more '13and 14-year-olds casually jumping into bed together these days' "); Colman McCarthy, Boycotting Glorified Violence, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1992, at A19 (discussing the link between
childhood exposure to violence and homicide rates while commending Senator Paul Simon for
successfully gaining congressional approval for his Television Violence Act, which grants
broadcasters and programmers antitrust immunity to encourage collaboration in developing
voluntary standards for the reduction of television violence); Proclamation No. 5315, 50 Fed.
Reg. 13,753 (1985) (presidential proclamation designating April 1985 National Child Abuse
Prevention Month and acknowledging that television violence is one of several problems "related to the ... weakness of our society's values"). See generally In re Children's Television
Programming Advertising Practices, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 75 F.C.C.2d 138, para. 6
(1979) [hereinafter 1980 Proposed Rulemaking] (reiterating that licencees have an obligation as
public trustees to meet the needs of the child viewer); In re Children's Television Programming
& Advertising Practices, Report & Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 634, paras. 2, 50 (1983) [hereinafter
1984 Report & Order] (terminating proceedings brought by Action for Children's Television to
require "minimum amounts of age-specific programming for children").
6. E.g., Harry A. Jessell & Patrick J. Sheridan, What's It All Mean?, BROADCASTING,
July 8, 1991, at 25 ("[tlhe market has changed dramatically over the past 15 years ....
Increased competition has changed the traditional underlying economics of the broadcasting
business.... The result is that... broadcaster[s] will have increasing difficulty competing [for
revenue]."). This increased competition presumably leads broadcasters to air more explicit
programming. See Julia Reed, Raunch 'n'Roll Radio is Here to Stay, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
R., May 4, 1987, at 52; see also Ray Quintanilla, Congress Seeks Reduction in TV Violence,
INVESTOR'S DAILY, Feb. 5, 1990, at 17 (quoting Senator Paul Simon's statement that
"[v]iolence adds ratings points and audience share. . . . It moves numbers" (alteration in
original)).
7. See supra note 5 (discussing Senator Paul Simon's efforts and FCC rulemakings).
8. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). The Court in
Sable held:
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Unlike newspapers, broadcasters owe the public a fiduciary duty. 9 The
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is required to regulate the
broadcast industry in a manner consistent with the public interest.' ° Since
1927, federal law has empowered the government to prohibit the broadcast
of obscene, indecent, or profane language. 1 Despite this broad congressional directive, the FCC has historically restricted its application; the
agency has limited both the scope of indecency's statutory meaning and the
extent to which the prohibition was enforced. 2 By the late 1980s, however,
Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment ....

The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally

protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least
restrictive means to further the articulated interest. We have recognized that there is
a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is
not obscene by adult standards. The Government may serve this legitimate interest,
but to withstand constitutional scrutiny, "it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First
Amendment freedoms."
Id. at 126 (quoting Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976)) (citations omitted).
9. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969). The public
trustee model rests on the premise that the broadcast frequencies are a limited public resource.
See id. at 389. Since spectrum scarcity exists, broadcast licensees are considered a public trust,
subject to government regulation. See id. Overall, the FCC has recognized four reasons
broadcasters deserve "special treatment": first, "children have access" to the medium and may
be "unsupervised by parents"; second, radio and television "receivers are in the home," a
location "where people's privacy interest is entitled to added deference"; third, "unconsenting
adults may tune in a station without any warning that offensive language is being ... broadcast"; and fourth, the "scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the government must...
license" and insure is used "in the public interest." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731
n.2 (1978).
10. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988); see also National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States,
415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974) (noting that the FCC is required to act in the public interest). See
generally DONALD E. LIVELY, MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW 201-56 (1991) (discussing
the history and licensing of broadcast communications).
11. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. Indecency should be distinguished from
obscenity. Obscene broadcasts are those which: (1) " 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find .

.

. taken as a whole .

.

. appeal[] to the prurient

interest"; (2) "depict[] or describe[], in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct"; and (3)
"taken as a whole, lack[] serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted). Indecency need not satisfy either the first or
third prong of the Miller test, only some version of the second prong. John Crigler & William
J. Byrnes, Decency Redux: The Curious History of the New FCC BroadcastIndecency Policy, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 329, 330 n.6 (1989).
12. See In Re Pacifica Found., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 750, paras.
17-18 (1983) (failing to penalize a licensee for both the broadcast of "offensive" and "vulgar"
programming as well as occasional use of the words such as "fuck," "shit," and "assholes"); In
Re WGBH Educ. Found., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, paras. 4-5
(1978) (refusing to deny license renewal for, among other things, the broadcast of nudity,
profanity and "vulgarity"); Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 11; see also infra notes 47-122 and
accompanying text.
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the FCC concluded that its policy regarding indecent broadcasts was both
"unduly narrow"' 3 and inconsistent with its enforcement responsibilities.14
In 1987, expressing a concern for the welfare of children, the agency began a
two-stage expansion of its indecency policy. 5 First, through the introduction of a "generic" standard, the FCC broadened its interpretation of the
statutory prohibition against broadcast "indecency."' 6 The generic standard, unlike its predecessor, permits consideration of a broadcast's context
and tone, rather than simply the identification of specific proscribed words. 17
Second, the agency intensified enforcement efforts.'

8

In Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 1), 19 a large coalition of
broadcast interests2" sought review of the FCC's new restrictions on broadcast indecency before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. 2' The coalition made two claims: first, that the agency's
13. In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 3 FCC Red. 930,
para. 5 (1987) [hereinafter Indecency Recon. Order].
14. Id.The FCC stated that "although enforcement was clearly easier under the former
standard, it could lead to anomalous results that could not be justified." Id.In particular, the
Commission noted that under its former standard, broadcasters could avoid charges simply by
avoiding "certain words." Id. According to the FCC, "[tihat approach, in essence, ignored an
entire category of speech by focusing exclusively on specific words." Id. The FCC concluded
that because this former approach "made neither legal nor policy sense ...[it] must take the
more difficult approach to enforcing Section 1464." Id.; see infra notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
15. Indecency Recon. Order, supra note 13; see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
748-49 (1978) (noting the ease with which children may gain access to radio broadcasts). The
agency also expressed its concern with the duties of broadcasters to children in a 1974 Policy
Statement. See In re Action for Children's Television (ACT), Report & Policy Statement, 50
F.C.C.2d 1 (1974). The FCC indicated that children, "because of their immaturity ....
require
programming designed specifically for them." Id.at para. 16. The FCC encouraged licensees
to make a "meaningful effort," id.at para. 20, to improve (1) the quantity of adequate children's programming, (2) the amount of educational and informational programming, (3) the
extent of age-specific programming directed to the intellectual development of pre-school and
school-age children, and (4) the scheduling of programming, balancing children's programming between weekends and weekdays, and not confining all or most of children's programming to Saturday and Sunday mornings. See generally id.at 6 (discussing these concerns);
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 90-97, 104-09 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
19. 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter ACT 1], vacated, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
20. Petitioners consisted of "commercial broadcasting networks, public broadcasting entities, licensed broadcasters, associations of broadcasters and journalists, program suppliers, and
public interest groups." Id.at 1334.
21. Id.The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit "has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of ...all
final orders of the Federal Communications Commission made reviewable by Section 402(a) of
title 47." 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); see also 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1988); infra notes 123-41 and
accompanying text.
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broader "generic" definition of indecency was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad2 2 and second, that a curtailment of the hours when indecent programs may be broadcast was unconstitutional.2 3 While upholding the FCC's
more expansive "generic" definition of indecency,2 4 the court held that content-based restrictions could be sustained only when they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.2 5 Although recognizing that the
protection of children is a compelling interest, the court lacked sufficient
evidence to justify further restrictions on broadcast indecency. 2 6 The court,
therefore, instructed the FCC to reconsider a suitable "safe harbor" period
during which nonobscene programs containing indecent speech could be
27
broadcast.
Shortly after ACT I was decided, Congress passed the Helms Adult Radio
Amendment, compelling the FCC to promulgate rules instituting a twentyfour-hour-ban on indecent broadcast programming.2" Despite concerns regarding the ban's constitutionality, the FCC subsequently issued an order
requiring broadcasters to comply with the Congressional mandate.2 9
Following its issuance, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals granted a petition for review of the FCC order. In Action for Children's Television v. FCC
22. ACTI, 852 F.2d at 1334. An overbroad statute is designed to burden or punish activities that are not protected by the Constitution, yet, nonetheless, includes within its scope constitutionally protected free speech activities. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 16.8.
A statute may also be void for vagueness. Id. at § 16.9. Vague statutes fail constitutional
scrutiny because of the principal that laws must give adequate notice to citizens as to what is
actual criminal activity and because police authority must be restricted to the arrest of persons
for actual violations of the law. Id. Therefore, the vagueness "doctrine consists of a strict
prohibition of statutes that burden speech in terms that are so vague as to either to allow
including protected speech in the prohibition or leaving an individual without clear guidance
as to the nature of speech for which he can be punished." Id.; see also infra notes 126-27 and
accompanying text.
23. See ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1334-35; infra note 123 and accompanying text.
24. ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1335; see also infra notes 104-22 and accompanying text (discussing the nature and development of a "generic" indecency standard).
25. ACTI, 852 F.2d at 1340-41; see Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989).
26. See ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1341.
27. Id. at 1343.
28. See Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judicial and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 2186,
2228 (1988) [hereinafter 1989 Appropriations Act]. The FCC's 1989 appropriations legislation contained the provision directing the FCC to enforce 18 U.S.C. § 1464 on a twenty-fourhour-per-day basis. See id.
29. In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency in 18
U.S.C. § 1464, Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 457 (1988) [hereinafter Indecency Order]. The Order
states: "The Commission will enforce the provisions of Section 1464 of the United States Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1464, on a twenty-four hour per day basis in accordance with Public
Law No. 100-459." Id. at 458.
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(ACT H),3o the same petitioners who brought A CT I challenged the constitutional legitimacy of the congressionally mandated ban. a ' While briefing
for ACT II was underway, however, the United States Supreme Court issued
its opinion in Sable Communications of California v. FCC.3 2 The Court's
decision in Sable held a complete ban on indecent commercial telephone
messages unconstitutional. 33 Believing that Sable was significant to the outcome of ACT II, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals granted the FCC's request for a remand to assemble data supporting the constitutionality of the
ban. 34 After soliciting public comments on the validity of the ban, the FCC
issued a report finding that significant numbers of children ages seventeen
and under listen to broadcasters at all times of the day without parental
supervision.3" The FCC "concluded that no alternative to a total ban would
effectuate the government's
compelling interest in protecting children from
36
broadcast indecency.",
In ACT II, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down as unconstitutional the FCC's statutorily mandated enforcement of a twenty-four-hour
ban on indecent programming. 37 At the same time, however, the court upheld the FCC's "generic" definition of indecency. a In prohibiting the
twenty-four-hour ban, the unanimous court relied upon its reasoning in A CT
I, where it had held that the FCC "must identify some reasonable period of
39
time during which indecent material may be broadcast."
This Note explores the history of cases and regulations affecting the
broadcast of indecent programming and analyzes how the court's reasoning
in A CT H may affect the future of broadcast content regulation. The Note
30. 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter ACTII], cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82
(1992).
31. Id. at 1507.
32. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).

33. Id. at 126-28.
34. ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1507.
35. In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
Report of the Commission, 5 FCC Rcd. 5297 (1990) [hereinafter Enforcement Report] (proceeding terminated). The study found that "more than 'a few of the most enterprising and
disobedient young people' " are in the audience for radio and television at all times of the day
and night. Id. at para. 65 (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 130). As evidence, the Enforcement
Report indicated that, "[a]lthough . . . 12 to 17 year olds listening between midnight and 6
a.m.... make up only 0.35% of the total population, this figure represents 716,000 children."

Id. (footnotes omitted). The Enforcement Report also noted the prevalence of VCR's and
audio tape recording devices which might also be used by enterprising children. Id. at para.
55.
36. ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1507 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 1510.
38. Id.at 1508.
39. Id. at 1509. The court noted that its "holding in ACTI... necessarily means that the
[FCC] may not ban [indecent] broadcasts entirely." Id.
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first examines the FCC's struggle to define "indecency," as well as the
agency's more recent efforts to establish a liberal construction of the term.
The Note then explores the agency's shift from the limited enforcement of
indecency to a twenty-four-hour-a-day standard. Next, this Note examines
how the United States Supreme Court's prohibition of a total ban on indecent telephone messages affected the outcome of ACT II. This Note considers the A CT II decision and concludes that the court's reasoning in A CT II
was flawed because the court failed to consider all relevant issues in a man-

ner wholly consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
I.

REGULATING INDECENCY

Indecent radio and television broadcasts are prohibited under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464.' Stations violating this provision are subject to fines,41 criminal
43
penalties, 42 and the non-renewal or revocation of their license to broadcast.
Critics emphasize, however, that the FCC has failed to provide broadcasters
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988). Section 1464 provides "[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Id. ;see also Radio Act of 1927, ch.
169, § 29, 44 Stat. 1172, 1173 (1927) (prohibiting the broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or profane language"). Section 1464 appears to contradict § 326 of the Federal Communications
Act. Section 326 states that "no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
[FCC] which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication."
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found
that these statutes were not in conflict. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978).
Obscene broadcasts, although not the focus of this Note, are also proscribed under § 1464 and
should be distinguished from those characterized as indecent ones. See supra note 11 (distinguishing obscenity from indecency).
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (providing for criminal penalties up to $10,000). The FCC also
maintains authority to issue a Notice of Apparent Liability for a monetary forfeiture pursuant
to § 503(b)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934. 42 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (1988). Under
§ 503(b), the FCC may assess forfeitures up to $25,000 for each violation or each day of a
continuing violation. Id. This dollar amount was increased by Congress in 1989. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 3002(i)(2), 103 Stat. 2106, 2131-32.
However, the FCC currently authorizes a $12,500 penalty, subject to upward or downward
adjustment, for an indecent or obscene broadcast. See In re Standards for Assessing Forfeitures, Policy Statement, 6 FCC Rcd. 4695 (1991). This penalty is typically levied against the
registered licensee. See, e.g., In re Petition for Recon. Concerning Liability of Evergreen Media Corp., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5950 (1991) (ordering the licensee to
forfeit $6,000 for broadcasts of indecent material).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (authorizing the issuance of jail terms up to two years for violations of the statute).
43. See, e.g., In re Armond J. Rolle, Order to Show Cause, 31 F.C.C.2d 533 (1971) (revoking an amateur radio license); In Re Palmetto Broadcasting Co., Decision, 33 F.C.C. 250
(1962) [hereinafter Palmetto], recon. denied, 34 F.C.C. 101, 103 at para. 9 (1963) (denying
license renewal due to the broadcast of material considered "coarse, vulgar, suggestive, or
susceptible of indecent double meaning"). Cf In Re Jack Straw Memorial Found., Application
21 F.C.C.2d 833 (imposing a short-term renewal), hearingordered on recon., 24 F.C.C.2d 266
(1970), license renewed, 29 F.C.C.2d 344 (1971) (ruling by A.L.J. granting full-term renewal).
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with clear guidelines for determining compliance with the statute or with
agency rules." As a result, critics maintain that broadcasters' inability to
measure standards keeps them in constant risk of violation4" or, in the alternative, forces them to refrain from broadcasting questionable programming
which might nonetheless pass agency scrutiny.4 6
A.

The Public Interest Standard

Prior to 1978, the FCC determined whether a broadcast licensee violated
indecency prohibitions on a case-by-case basis.47 In making such determinations the agency often held stations in violation of its indecency policy without specific findings that the station had violated the statutory requirements
of § 1464.48 Rather, the agency justified penalties using nebulous "public
interest" 4 9 and public trust standards.5"
In In Re Jack Straw Memorial Foundation,5" for example, station KRABFM in Seattle, Washington, was penalized by the FCC for the single incident
of a broadcast of "three so-called four-letter words [that] were used . . .
44. See, e.g., In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.s.C.

§ 1464, Comments of Cohn & Marks, MM Docket No. 89-494 (Feb. 20, 1990) [hereinafter
C&M Comments]. In a survey of 75 broadcasters, 52 believed that the FCC should "provide
more specific guidance to broadcasters about what types of programming will be considered
'indecent.'" Id., attachment 2, at 1; see also id., attachments 2, 3. In objecting to the imposition of criminal penalties for the distribution of obscene materials to consenting adults, Justice
Brennan stated that:
the concept of "obscenity" cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to
provide fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually oriented materials,
to prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of the attempt to
suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very costly institutional harms.
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. See C&M Comments, supra note 44, attachments 2, 3.
46. See id. Broadcasters, because of their uncertainty concerning indecency standards,
have felt forced to do the following: edit feature films, "stay on the safe side," edit lyrics, edit
an "acclaimed" Irish drama, refuse to air commercials, and refrain from airing a National
Public Radio program on sex between blind persons. Id., attachment 3, at 3.
Upon receipt of an indecent broadcast complaint and following a staff review, the FCC may
issue a Letter of Inquiry requesting that a licensee respond to the allegations. See, e.g., Letter
from the FCC to Goodrich Broadcasting, Inc. (WVIC-FM), 6 FCC Rcd. 2178, 2178-79 (1991)
(discussing the issuance of the Letter of Inquiry). Upon the receipt of a reply, and following
further determination, the FCC may issue a Notice of Apparent Liability. See id. at 2178.
The licensee is typically afforded 30 days to pay the penalty or to show why the penalty should
not be imposed or should be reduced. See id. at 2178-79. If the licensee responds to the
Notice of Apparent Liability, the FCC, will consider all relevant information and issue a final
order. See generally 47 C.F.R. § 1.80 (1991) (discussing forfeiture proceedings in detail).
47. See infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
49. Palmetto, supra note 43, paras. 20, 25-27.
50. See infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
51. 21 F.C.C,2d 833 (1970).
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several times" 5 2 during the broadcast of a thirty-hour taped autobiographical novel.53 Although the majority of commissioners failed to identify the
incident as a violation of § 1464, the agency nonetheless punished the station
with a limited one-year renewal of its license based on a violation of the
public trust.5 4 Opposing the penalty, Commissioner Cox called the decision
"arbitrary and capricious.", 5 5
Similarly, in In Re WUHY-FM, Eastern Education Radio,56 the Commission penalized station WtUHY-FM in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for its
broadcast of an interview with Jerry Garcia, member of the California musical group, the "Grateful Dead." ' During the course of the interview, Mr.
Garcia, in addition to stating "his views on ecology, music, philosophy, and
interpersonal relations," used numerous "four letter" expletives.58 Although the majority of commissioners ruled that the language could be interpreted as violations of § 1464's prohibition against indecency, it held that its
authority to act was clearly justified under a "public interest" standard.59
Under this standard, material that was patently offensive by contemporary
community standards and without redeeming social value could be sanc52. Id. at 834 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Cox).

53. Id.
54. See id. at 833-34 (majority opinion). Indeed, the majority specifically noted "that the
critical consideration [for it was] not whether or not action under 18 U.S.C. 1464 [was] warranted." Id. at 833.
55. Id. at 837 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Cox). The Commissioner noted
that, under the majority's reasoning, broadcasters were required to observe "an undefined standard-indeed, a nonexistent standard." Id. In his vigorous dissent, Commissioner Cox unknowingly summarized the logic and emotion behind the critics of the FCC's "generic"
definition of indecency.
[L]icensees do not know even now what the dangerous words [which are forbidden]
are because the majority have not listed them ....And no one-probably not even
the majority-knows what other words will bring down the Commission's wrath
upon a licensee who permits their broadcast-regardless of frequency, context, social
value, or even knowledge by the licensee that they were to be used.... But failure to
publish the list may have even more chilling effect upon broadcast programming,
because licensees may avoid the use of many, many more words out of fear that they
may be on the Commission's secret list.
Id. at 837-38.
56. Notice of Apparent Liability, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970) [hereinafter Eastern].
57. Id. at para. 2.
58. Id. at para. 3. During the 50 minute interview, Mr. Garcia interspersed the words
"fuck" and "shit," using them as adjectives, introductory expletives, or as substitutes for the
term "et cetera." See id.
59. Id. at paras. 6, 10, 13. The majority of commissioners reasoned that "the speech
involved has no redeeming social value, and is patently offensive by contemporary community
standards, with very serious consequences to the 'public interest in the larger and more effective use of radio.' " Id. at para. 6; see also Palmetto, supra note 43, at paras. 20, 25-27 (reasoning that indecent transmissions may be penalized under generalized public interest
standards without regard to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1464).
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tioned. ° After concluding that there was no evidence that Garcia's language "in some way served the needs and interests of the area,"'', the agency
fined the station one hundred dollars.62
Again, Commissioner Cox disagreed in part with the majority's conclusion. 63 The Commissioner reasoned that the language used by Garcia was
not indecent and that the station did not violate the public interest with the
broadcast of the interview." Cox noted that the programming should not be
considered indecent because "certain language not normally heard in polite
circles, was uttered."'65 Similarly, he stated that the programming should be
considered in the public interest because the basic subject matter of the
broadcast was decent and of obvious interest to the public.66 In this sense,
Cox reasoned that the interview was a documentary which could not be
" 'deemed indecent because the subject incidentally used strong or salty
language.' ,67
In sum, the public trust standard proved to be too imprecise for both
broadcasters and the FCC. This imprecision arguably led to the imposition
of penalties when there was no actual violation of the standard. Furthermore, the standard's vagueness created an incentive for broadcasters to
avoid the transmission of questionable speech, and thereby chilled the broadcast of otherwise permissible programming.
B.

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Seven "Filthy Words"

The 1978 Supreme Court decision in FCC v. PacificaFoundation61 significantly contributed to the creation of a more definitive standard for determin60. See Eastern, supra note 56, at para. 13.
61. Id. at 414, para. 14 n.8.
62. Id. at para. 16.
63. Id. at 417 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Cox).
64. See id. at 419.
65. See id. (quoting the licensees argument).
66. See id. at 420-21. Additionally, Cox reasoned that the language of Mr. Garcia reflected his personality and lifestyle. See id. at 418.
67. Id. at 419 (quoting argument made in letter from licensee). Commissioner Cox's concern with the chilling effects of the Commission's actions was echoed in the following
statement:
I think we may find that the majority are wrong in stating ... that we can exercise
these words from radio "without stifling in the slightest any thought which the person wishes to convey." One safe course for the timid will be simply to avoid interviewing people who can be expected to use troublesome language, or inviting them to
participate in panels, or asking them to comment on current developments. This
may be "safe" for the licensee but I'm not sure it will be safe for our society.
Id. at 420-21. Implicit in the Commissioner's statement is the belief that the licensee in Eastern may have actually furthered the public interest through the broadcast of the program with
Mr. Garcia and the exploration of his unconventional personality, lifestyle and perspectives.
68. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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ing which programming would be considered "indecent" for purposes of
penalties arising under § 1464.69 Pacifica arose out of a complaint from a

motorist who claimed he and his "young son" inadvertently heard comedian
George Carlin's "Filthy Words" 70 monologue at two o'clock in the afternoon over radio station WBAI-FM in New York City.7" The FCC subse-

quently issued a declaratory ruling against Pacifica, but refrained from
issuing other sanctions.7 2 The agency determined, first, that the monologue
depicted "sexual and excretory activities and organs in a manner patently
offensive" and, second, that the broadcast occurred at a time of day when
there were many children in the audience.7 3 The Commission noted, therefore, that the monologue was indecent and prohibited under § 1464. 7 4 The
FCC concluded, however, that "patently offensive language" such as Carlin's monologue, should be channeled to those times when children are not
listening, rather than being prohibited altogether.75
The D.C. Circuit subsequently reversed the FCC order.7 6 The Supreme
Court thereafter reversed the appellate court and reaffirmed the original
FCC order.77 The Court held that the FCC's action did not constitute cen69. See generally id. (proscribing seven words from broadcast).
70. The seven words used in George Carlin's monologue were: "shit, piss, fuck, cunt,
cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits." Id. at 751.
71. Id. at 729-30.
72. In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), Memorandum Opinion & Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 16 (1975). Congress has authorized the Commission to revoke station licenses, issue cease and desist orders, or impose monetary forfeitures for
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)-(b), 503(b)(1)(E). Pacifica,438 U.S. at
730 n. 1. The Commission is also empowered to deny license renewals or grant a short-term
renewals. Id.
73. 56 F.C.C.2d at para. 14.
74. See id. The ruling was associated with the station's license file. Id. While avoiding
any immediate penalty, such action may detrimentally effect a licensee at renewal time. See id.
75. See id. at para. 11. The FCC concluded that offensive material which has "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" should be prohibited at those hours when children are likely to be in the audience. See id. at para. 16; see also id. at para. 11. Similarly,
such material might be permitted, if children are not likely to be in the audience at the time of
broadcast. See id. at para. 16; see also In re Petition for Clarification or Reconsideration of a
Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 59 F.C.C.2d
892 (1976) (denying reconsideration of this issue).
76. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Of the three-judge panel, Judge Tamm concluded that the agency's action was invalid either on
the ground that the order constituted censorship, expressly forbidden by § 326 of the Communications Act of 1934, or on the ground that the agency's opinion was the equivalent of a rule
which was vague and overbroad. See id. at 10-18. Chief Judge Bazelon concluded that § 1464
covers only language that is obscene or otherwise unprotected. See id. at 24-30. Judge
Leventhal, however, dissented and concluded that the daytime broadcast was indecent. Id. at
31.
77. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 741, 751 (1978).
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sorship, forbidden under § 326 of the Communications Act, 78 and that
speech which is not obscene "may be restricted as 'indecent' under the authority of... § 1464." 79 In affirming the FCC's order, the Court concluded
that while the prohibition against censorship under § 326 precludes advance
editing by the Commission, it does not forbid the review of completed broadcasts.8 0 The Court also reasoned that the legislative history of the statute
supports the finding that § 326 was not intended to limit the FCC's power to
regulate broadcasts of obscene, indecent, or profane language."1 Rejecting
Pacifica's challenge to § 1464,2 the Court concluded that the broadcast was
indecent and that it fell within the scope of § 1464.83 The Court dismissed
Pacifica's assertion that the standard was so vague that it would lead to the
"chilling" of permissible speech.14 The Court concluded that the standard
would deter only the broadcast of offensive sexual references. 8 5
Thus, the Court in Pacifica held that the government could, under § 1464,
constitutionally regulate indecent broadcasts.16 The Court justified its position by recognizing the uniqueness of the broadcast medium.17 Broadcasters' pervasive presence in the home and children's access to the medium
justified the greater restrictions."' Because alternatives exist for adults to
78. See id. at 735-38. Section 326 provides that:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any
radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
47 U.S.C. § 326.
79. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735; see also id. at 735-41.
80. Id. at 735.
81. See id. at 738.
82. Id.at 741. The Court rejected Pacifica's claim that the broadcast was not indecent
because it failed to contain "prurient appeal." Id. The Court reasoned that the normal definition of indecent merely refers to "nonconformance with accepted standards of morality." Id.
at 740. The Court also rejected Pacifica's claim that § 1464 was overbroad. Id. at 742.
83. Id. at 740-41.
84. Id.at 743.
85. Id. (holding that the rule "will deter only the broadcast[] of patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities").
86. Id. at 743-44.
87. Id.at 748 (noting that "each medium of expression presents special First Amendment
problems").
88. Id. at 748-49. Broadcasters, occupying a "uniquely pervasive presence" in the home,
id.at 748, and maintaining "accessib[ility] to children, even those too young to read," were
reasonably subject to stronger restrictions than other media. Id.at 749. The Court found the
regulation of broadcast indecency similar to Ginsberg v. New York, a case involving adult
publications. Id.In Ginsberg, the Court also recognized the government's interests in youth
and the "parents' claim to authority in their own household" as justification for prohibiting the
distribution of the publications to children. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968);
see also id.at 639- 40.
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gain access to such material, the Court noted that the Commission's action

did not "reduce adults to hearing only what is fit for children."8 9
Although the Pacifica decision upheld the FCC's authority to regulate
indecent broadcasts, the scope of the ruling was limited in several respects.
First, the plurality opinion in Pacifica was narrowly drafted and widely interpreted as applying only to the unique facts of the case. 9 For this reason,
Pacifica'sdefinition of indecency, the "repetitive, deliberate use" 9 of words
that refer to "excretory or sexual activities or organs" in a "patently offensive, ' '9 2 but non-obscene manner, became synonymous with the repeated use
of one or more of Carlin's seven "filthy words." 93 Technically, innuendo
and double entendre were outside the scope of indecency under the Pacifica
standard.94 Additionally, the Court in Pacifica reserved its judgement as to
whether indecent broadcasts would be permissible at times when few chil-

dren were in the audience.9" Adopting a nuisance rationale,9 6 the Court
quoted Justice Sutherland's analogy that nuisance, or in this instance, indecent programming broadcast at an inappropriate hour, is "like a pig in the

parlor instead of the barnyard."9 7
Consistent with the Court's narrow holding in Pacifica, the FCC limited
its enforcement of the indecency standard to broadcasts beginning before ten
p.m.9" The FCC assumed that broadcasts after ten p.m. would not be rea89. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 n.28.
90. Id. at 755-56 (Powell, J., concurring); Richard G. Passler, Comment, Regulation of
Indecent Radio Broadcasts: George Carlin Revisited-What Does the Future Holdfor the Seven
"Dirty" Words?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 131, 136 (1990).
91. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., In Re WGBH Educ. Found., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 69 F.C.C.2d
1250, 1254 (1978).
94. See Passler, supra note 90, at 140.
95. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 n.28. See also Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 11, at 330.
96. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750; see also Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986) (affirming view that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions may be placed on
the distribution of indecent material consistent with the First Amendment); Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); New Indecency Enforcement Standards to Be Applied
to All Broadcast and Amateur Radio Licensees, PublicNotice, 2 FCC Rcd. 2726 (1987) [hereinafter New Enforcement Standards](reasoning by analogy, that if the owner of a theater may
permissibly separate adults from children, and the book store owner is able to refuse the sale of
publication of books to children, indecent broadcast material may also be channelled). The
Commission noted, "[flor the broadcast medium ... the only practicable means for separating
adults from children ... is to impose time restrictions." Id.
97. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386
(1926)). Justice Sutherland stated that indecency "may be merely a right thing in the wrong
place." Id.; see also, Rocio De Lourdes Cordoba, To Air or Not to Err: The Threat of Conditioned Federal Fundsfor Indecent Programmingon Public Broadcasting, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
635, 654-60 (1986).
98. Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 11, at 330.
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sonably likely to be heard by children.99 Indecent broadcasts after ten p.m.
were thus sheltered by a constitutional "safe harbor.'"'0
Following the Pacifica decision, the FCC's enforcement of indecent
broadcasts waned. °1 In 1986, however, several interest groups began pressuring the agency's chairman to take stronger action.'0 2 The Commission
responded in April 1987 by simultaneously attempting to broaden the definition of indecency and narrow the "safe harbor" period which protected the
broadcast of "indecent" programming after 10 p.m.'0 3
C.

Three Shots Across the Bow. "Generic" Standardsand the Shrinking
"Safe Harbor"

In moving to extend the scope of § 1464, the FCC promulgated a "generic" standard of indecency; the new standard reflects the Commission's
desire to move beyond the limitations of Pacifica and to include a wider
99. See Cordoba, supra note 97, at 662-63.
100. See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 11, at 330, 352. This limited ban was sufficiently
tailored to satisfy the Court's requirements that it be the least restrictive means available to
satisfy the state interest in question.
101. See id. at 345. According to the Comment's authors, following Pacifica, the FCC
received approximately 20,000 complaints annually alleging obscene or indecent broadcasts.
The agency, however, took no action against the broadcasters involved. Id. Presumably, the
broadcasts complained of did not fall within the narrow definition of indecency.
102. See id. at 344-48. According to Crigler and Byrnes, the picketing of the FCC's Washington offices by Morality in Media in June 1986 appears to have been a catalyst for the policy
shift. Id. at 343. The group was protesting the renomination of Mark Fowler as the agency's
chairman. Id. at 344. Until the protests, Mark Fowler carried "the rallying cry of... 'deregulation.'" Id.; see also, Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 207 (1982) (championing former FCC Chairman
Mark Fowler's deregulatory viewpoint). In July, 1986, however, Chairman Fowler appeared
to have reached an agreement with Morality in Media and the National Decency Forum, two
groups responsible for the picketing. Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 11, at 345. In a letter dated
July 9, 1986, the National Decency Forum advised the Chairman that "his organization would
discontinue the planned picketing for the following week." Id. The letter reflected the organization's understanding that the FCC General Counsel would cooperate on sending a message
to broadcasters by bringing some decency actions and investigations. Id. On July 21, 1986,
the National Decency Forum and Morality in Media met with Mr. Fowler. Id. Morality in
Media subsequently passed along advice, provided by the FCC's General Counsel, to its supporters. Id.
103. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (concerning a discussion of the attempt
to constrict the "safe harbor" period). The FCC responded with three orders finding that
stations had broadcast indecent programming in violation of § 1464. See In re Pacifica Found.
(KPFK-FM), Memorandum Opinion & Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 2698, recon. granted in part, 3
FCC Rcd. 930 (1987); In re The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Memorandum Opinion & Order,
2 FCC Rcd. 2703 [hereinafter Regents], recon. grantedin part, 3 FCC Rcd. 930 (1987); In re
Infinity Broadcasting Corp., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 2705 [hereinafter
Infinity], recon, granted in part,. 3 FCC Rcd. 930 (1987). The Commission affirmed all three
decisions on reconsideration. See Indecency Recon. Order, supra note 13.
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range of material."° Under the FCC's new "generic" standard, indecency
includes those broadcasts describing sexual and excretory organs and activities in a manner that is "patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium ' 'lOS at times when there is a
10 6
"risk that children may be in the audience."'
In April 1987, the FCC began to apply this more expansive standard.107
In three instances,"0 8 the agency issued warnings to commercial radio
stations concerning the broadcast of material violative of a "generic" indecency standard."9 The first warning, Pacifica Foundation (Pacifica11), involved two complaints against station KPFK-FM Los Angeles for the
broadcast of excerpts from the unpublished play "Jerker" as well as a live
broadcast entitled "Shocktime U.S.A."' 1 0 The live program allegedly contained profane remarks."' The play, aimed at listeners in the local gay community, contained explicit conversation and descriptions of anal
intercourse." 2 Although the station warned its listeners that the play contained material that some might find offensive, and although ratings indicated that few young listeners tuned into the broadcast, the FCC nonetheless
persisted with its charges. 113
The second warning was directed at the Regents of the University of California and involved student-run radio station KCSB-FM's broadcast of a
song called "Makin' Bacon.""' The broadcast made clear reference to sexual activities and organs, but unlike the Carlin monologue, it did not make
repetitive reference to the "seven filthy words. ' 5
104. See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 11.
105. See Infinity, 2 FCC Rcd. at 2705.
106. See id.
107. See infra note 109. Recognizing that the broadcasters were subject to an unforeseen
shift in policy and that the broadcasts at issue would not have violated the former definition of
indecency, the FCC issued only warnings to each licensee. See New Enforcement Standards,
supra note 96, at 2731-32. The Commission stated, however, that further violations would
subject a licensee to more severe sanctions. Id. at 2732.
108. A fourth instance involved an amateur radio operator. See New Enforcement Standards, supra note 96, at 2737.
109. See In re Pacifica Found. (KPFK-FM), Memorandum Opinion & Order, 2 FCC Rcd.
2698, recon. granted in part, 3 FCC Rcd. 930 (1987); In re Regents, Memorandum Opinion &
Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 2703, recon. grantedin part, 3 FCC Rcd 930 (1987); Infinity, 2 FCC Rcd.
2705, recon. granted in part, 3 FCC Rcd. 930 (1987).
110. See Pacifica Found., 2 FCC Rcd. 2698 at paras. 3, 5.
111. Id. at para. 3. The complaint concerned a narration and song containing the words
"eat shit," and "mother fucker." Id. The complaint did not allege whether the words were
used in a repetitive fashion. Id.
112. Id. at paras. 19-28.
113. Id. at para. 6.
114. See Regents, 2 FCC Rcd. 2703.
115. See Passler, supra note 90, at 137-38.
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The third warning, Infinity Broadcasting, charged WYSP-FM with the
broadcast of sexual innuendo and double entendre." 6 The broadcasts occurred during the Howard Stern morning show." 7 In emphasizing the more
expansive nature of the "generic" indecency standard, the FCC noted that
sexual innuendo and double entendre are actionable if mixed with explicit
references that make the understanding of the discussion "capable only of
one meaning.""'
In applying its new "generic" indecency standard, the
FCC once again significantly increased broadcasters' potential exposure to

liability while failing to mitigate concerns that the applicable standard for
determining broadcast indecency is both vague and overbroad.
Concurrent -with its 1987 shift to a "generic" standard, the FCC also
sought to step up enforcement and narrow the "safe harbor" for indecent
broadcasts." 9 The agency asserted that, despite its prior assumptions, recent evidence indicated that children remained in the broadcast audience

after 10 p.m.' 20 Consistent with its intensified enforcement policy, the FCC,
in both Regents and Pacifica II, warned stations of indecent programming
broadcast after ten p.m. 121 The agency later indicated that it found chil1 22
dren's risk of exposure sufficiently reduced after midnight.
116. See Infinity, supra note 103.
117. Id. at para. 2.
118. Id. at para. 9.
119. See New Enforcement Standards, supra note 96; Enforcement Report, supra note 35,
para. 6. Separate from the question of indecency standards is the issue of enforcement. Literally interpreted, § 1464 authorizes a ban on both obscene and indecent broadcasts. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464 (1988). Prior to 1987, however, the FCC limited the statutory prohibition against indecent broadcasts to those aired after ten p.m.; the hours following ten p.m. were considered to
be a "safe harbor" for the broadcast of indecent or questionable material. See Enforcement
Report, supra note 35, para. 6. The "safe harbor" was justified by the FCC's assumption that
children were not in the broadcast audience following 10 p.m. See id. at para. 3.
120. See New Enforcement Standards, supra note 96. The FCC declared "despite prior
assumptions that children were not in the broadcast audience at 10:00 p.m., recent evidence for
the markets involved indicates that there is still a reasonable risk that children may be in the
listening audience." Id. at 2726.
121. See In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 2 FCC Rcd.
2703, para. 2, recon. granted in part, 3 FCC Rcd. 930 (1987); In re Pacifica Found., Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion & Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 2698, para. 5, recon. grantedin part, 3 FCC Rcd.
930 (1987).
122. See Indecency Recon. Order, supra note 13, at para. 27.
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II.

CHALLENGING THE NEW INDECENCY POLICY:

A.

ACT I

The ACT I Decision

In Action for Children's Television v. FCC'2 3 (ACT I), a group of broadcasters, associations, program suppliers, and public interest groups 124 challenged the FCC's new regulatory scheme for indecency. 125 In contesting the
FCC's indecency standard, the petitioners charged that the new standard
was unconstitutionally vague 126 and that it was overbroad."' In challenging the agency's enforcement policy, the petitioners also claimed that the
current post-midnight "safe harbor" had no adequate factual foundation and
that the policy was arbitrary and capricious.' 2 8
1.

Generic Standards Upheld

In upholding the FCC's generic definition of indecency, the court found
the petitioners' vagueness and overbreadth challenges without merit.' 29 The
court concluded that Pacifica previously addressed the vagueness issue and

that, as a lower court, it remained confined by the Supreme Court's implicit
123.

852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

124. Action for Children's Television announced in January, 1992, that it would cease operation later in the year. Peggy Charren, TV View: Kidvid: Doing Battle with G.I. Joe, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1992, § 2, at 29.

125. ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988), vacated, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
126. Id. at 1334. Petitioners claimed that while the Commission, following Pacifica, had
tailored the indecency standard to make it reasonably certain and to afford "breathing space,"
the new "generic" standard is " 'inherently vague.'" Id. at 1338. Specifically, the petitioners
claimed that the FCC failed to provide broadcasters with a "meaningful guide identifying the
category of material subject to regulation" and that the agency's definition "adds nothing significant in the way of clarification." Id.; see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
629 (1984); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (stating that a statute or
regulation is void for vagueness if it "either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application").
127. ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1339. The intervening American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
made this assertion. Id. The ACLU based its charge upon the FCC's failure to exempt works
of "serious merit" from its definition of indecency. Id. The ACLU claimed that the agency's
standard for indecency should properly include an assessment "that the 'work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.' " Id. (quoting Brief of Intervenors ACLU et al. at 30, ACTI, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (No. 88-106) (quoting Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). The FCC, while considering "merit" as a factor in a
determination concerning broadcast indecency, "'reject[ed] an approach that would hold that
if a work has merit, it is per se not indecent.' " Id.
128. Id. at 1335.
129. Id.
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conclusion that a "generic" standard was capable of surviving a vagueness
challenge. 130
In rejecting the overbreadth challenge, the court noted that although indecent speech qualifies for First Amendment protection, the state maintains
extraordinary power to protect children's interests. 13 ' Therefore, the court
reasoned that while material may have significant social value, it may none32
theless contain language or descriptions offensive and harmful to children. 1
Since the merit of a work will not necessarily mollify the impact of particular
words or phrases on children, the court refused to strike down as overbroad
the FCC's practice of treating merit as one factor in an overall determination
1 33
of whether broadcast material is patently offensive.
2. Protecting the "Safe Harbor"
While dismissing the petitioners' attacks upon the FCC's generic definition of indecency, the ACT I court did find merit in their claim that the
agency failed to substantiate its reasons for narrowing the "safe harbor" during which indecent speech may be broadcast.134 Specifically, the court found
that the FCC used listener data to reach unjustifiable conclusions.1 35 Similarly, the FCC gave no explanation as to why, contrary to previous in130. Id. The court stated that "if acceptance of the FCC's generic definition of 'indecent'
as capable of surviving a vagueness challenge is not implicit in Pacifica, we have misunderstood Higher Authority and welcome correction." Id. at 1339.
131. The court stated, "[c]hildren's access to indecent material ... may be regulated, because 'even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms "the power of the state to control
the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults."' " Id. at 1340
(quoting Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631 (1968) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
132. According to the court, the material "may contain language and descriptions as offensive, from the perspective of parental control over children's exposure, as material lacking such
value." Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1341. The court held that "the evidence on which the [FCC] rested its channeling decisions [was] insubstantial, and [that] its findings [were] more ritual than real." Id.
Moreover, the court stated that:
We agree that, in view of the curtailment of broadcaster freedom and adult listener
choice that channeling entails, the Commission failed to consider fairly and fully
what time lines should be drawn. We therefore vacate, in the Pacifica Foundation
and Regents of U.C. cases, the FCC's ruling that the broadcast under review was
actionable, and we remand those cases to the agency for thoroughgoing reconsideration of the times at which indecent material may be aired.
Id. The court, however, affirmed the declaratory ruling in Infinity because the actionable
portions of a talk show aired from 6 to 10 a.m. Id.
135. Id. The court noted that the FCC's use of listener data to indicate the number of
teens in the overall audience was not determinative of the number of children in the audience
when the radio station aired the questionable material. Id. at 1341-42. Furthermore, the
court noted that there was no basis for a comparison between the number of teens in the
listening audience and the total number in the listening area. Id. at 1342.
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stances, it included twelve to seventeen year-olds in its definition of
"children" subject to protection under the standard.13 6 The court instructed
the FCC to substantiate its post-midnight channeling policy through a notice
of proposed rulemaking.1 37 Moreover, the court directed the FCC to ensure
that, in the future, it accommodated the competing interests of government,1 38 parents,1 39 broadcasters,14 and adult listeners. 4 '
B.

CongressionalAction: The Helms Adult Radio Amendment

While broadcasters challenged the restrictiveness of the FCC's indecency
regulations in court, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina began to work
within Congress to ensure that the FCC would take an even tougher
stance.' 4 2 Long before the ACT I decision, the Senator began numerous
inquiries into the agency's limited enforcement policy.' 43 Specifically, the
136. The court noted that "the FCC ventures no explanation why it takes teens aged 12-17
to be the relevant age group for channeling purposes." Id. at 1341. The FCC had previously
reasoned that:
"Age 12 was selected since it is the accepted upper limit for children's programming
in the industry and at the Commission. The Commission considered using the generally recognized age of majority- 18-but concluded that it would be virtually impossible for a broadcaster to minimize the risk of exposure to 18-year-olds."
Id. at 1342 (quoting 122 CONG. REC. S33,367 n.119 (1988)). In sum, the court concluded,
"[i]f... the FCC continues to consider children under 12 as the age group of concern, it
should either supply information on the listening habits of children in that age range, or explain how it extrapolates relevant data for that population from the available ratings information." Id.
137. Id. at 1343.
138. Id. (quoting Indecency Recon. Order, supra note 13, at para. 27 n.47) (noting that the
government "has a compelling interest in protecting children from indecent material").
139. Id. The court noted that parents "are entitled to decide whether their children are
exposed to such material if it is aired." Id. (quoting Indecency Recon. Order, supra note 13, at
para. 27 n.47).
140. Id. Broadcasters, according to the court, "are entitled to air such material at times of
day when there is not a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." Id. (quoting
Indecency Recon. Order, supra note 13, at para. 27 n.47).
141. Id. Adult listeners, according to the court, "have a right to see and hear programming that is inappropriate for children but not obscene." Id. (quoting Indecency Recon. Order, supra note 13, at para. 27 n.47).
142. See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 11, at 354.
143. On April 7, 1988, Senator Helms contacted the Heritage Foundation, a conservative
"think-tank." See id. at 352-54. The Senator requested assistance concerning: the requirements of the "safe harbor" rule, the requirements of Pacifica I, the validity of the FCC's
statement that Supreme Court precedent precludes it from a total ban of non-obscene broadcast programming, and whether Pacifica I prohibits a ban on the broadcast of indecent material intended for adults as well as children. 134 CONG. REC. S9913-15 (daily ed. July 26,

1988).
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Senator expressed his concern regarding the channeling of indecent speech
into the late-night "safe harbor."'"
On July 26, 1988, Senator Helms introduced an amendment to an appropriations bill' 4 5 that required the FCC to promulgate regulations enforcing a
twenty-four hour ban on indecent programming by January 31, 1989.146 In
sponsoring the amendment, Senator Helms expressed his concern regarding
children's inadvertent exposure to "unacceptable" language. 147 Furthermore, he attacked the broadcast of "trash," particularly when it directly
contravenes § 1464's outright prohibition against all obscene and indecent
speech.148 Additionally, Helms contended that channeling indecent material
49
to periods after midnight was futile because of home taping technology.'
The Senate subsequently supported Helms' amendment with little discus-

sion,' 50 and President Reagan later signed the bill into law.' 5 '
144. Although the Helms amendment may be viewed as a Congressional endorsement of
free speech restrictions in the broadcast medium, it may also be seen as simply another, more
restrictive, channeling measure. Under the Helms amendment, indecent material is channeled
to non-broadcast sources. Arguably, therefore, the restrictions of the amendment are less objectionable on constitutional grounds, and the amendment is not inconsistent with Pacifica
because alternatives remain for adults to gain access to indecent material, albeit not within the
broadcast medium. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Supporters of the amendment
argue that the Act does not "reduce adults to hearing only what is fit for children," Pacifica,
438 U.S. 726, 750 n.28 (1978), because adults may go to other easily accessible forums where
such communication is permissible. Helms wrote former FCC Chairman Dennis Patrick concerning the agency's "safe harbor" policy. 134 CONG. REC. S9912 (daily ed. July 26, 1988).
In his letter, the Senator asked whether material which the FCC had found indecent would,
nonetheless, be considered non-actionable if it fell within the post-midnight window. Patrick
responded that it was "very unlikely" that the agency would have found that the broadcasters
violated the indecency proscription if the questionable programming was aired after midnight.

Id.
145. See 1989 Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102
Stat.) 2186, 2228 (1988). The amendment was attached to an appropriations bill for funding
the FCC and other federal agencies. Id.
146. The amendment required that "[b]y January 31, 1989, the Federal Communications
Commission shall promulgate regulations in accordance with section 1464, title 18, United
States Code, to enforce the provisions of such section on a 24 hour per day basis." Id.
147. In defending his amendment, the Senator asked:
[W]hat happends [sic] when a child unintentionally tunes in and hears or sees material describing, by innuendo, how to have sex? Or when an 8-year-old girl turns on
her radio to hear the deejay describe sex acts by the use of metaphors? Or when a 10
year old boy who hears a recitation of how homosexuals do their perverted acts?
How much damage will be done?
134 CONG. REC. S9912 (daily ed. July 26, 1988).
148. Id. at S9911-12.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. 1989 Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 100-459, § 608, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.)
2186, 2188 (1988).
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C. JudicialResponse to Administrative Action: Stemming the Tide of a
Twenty-Four-Hour Ban
On December 21, 1988, the FCC issued an order indicating that it must
enforce a twenty-four-hour ban on indecent broadcast programming, 52 effective January 27, 1989.153 Furthermore, the agency noted its intent to
continue defining indecency generically.154 Because Congress mandated the
new rule, the FCC terminated the proceedings required by the court in A CT
I and denied any opportunity for public comment.1 55 Despite concern over
the ban's constitutionality, the FCC passed the rule because the Helms
156
Amendment provided no other alternative.
In ACT II, the FCC's order was subsequently challenged by numerous
media and citizens groups. 157 In challenging the order before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the petitioners first sought to stay the effective date of
the ban. 5 ' Judge Ruth Ginsburg, who authored the court's opinion in ACT
I, was part of the three judge panel hearing the argument. 159 During the
course of the proceeding, it became apparent that the court had no changeof-heart; it was not amenable to the agency's case. 16° Within an hour after
the conclusion of oral argument, the three-judge panel granted a stay of the
congressionally mandated twenty-four-hour ban on indecency pending fur152. Indecency Order, supra note 29, at 457.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 457-58.
155. The FCC stated that pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1988), the FCC:
finds good cause for promulgating the rule herein without prior public notice and
comment. Section 553 (b)(3)(B) provides that an agency may promulgate a rule
without notice and comment "when the agency for good cause finds... that notice
and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." Because the recently enacted appropriations legislation mandates implementation of a twenty-four hour indecency ban, the Commission's task in
promulgating the rule is purely ministerial and leaves no room for discretion. No
purpose would thus be served by affording the public an opportunity to comment on
this rule before its promulgation.
Id. (citation omitted).
156. Id. at 458 (Dennis, Comm'r, concurring). The rule states that "[tihe Commission will
enforce the provisions of Section 1464 of the United States Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
on a twenty-four hour per day basis in accordance with Public Law No. 100-459." Id.; see
also ACT 11, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1281-82 (1992).
157. See, e.g., Chances Slim for 24-hour FCC Ban on Indecency, BROADCASTING, Jan. 30,
1989, at 58 [hereinafter Chances Slim]; see Passler, supra note 90, at 147-48.
158. See Chances Slim, supra note 157, at 58.
159. Id.
160. For example, Judge Silberman noted that "[tihe statute is in conflict with this court,"
id., while Judge Ginsburg "reminded" FCC counsel Sue Preskill that the ACT I decision involved "reasonable channeling." Id.
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ther judicial review by the circuit court.1 6 ' For the time being, the FCC was
limited to the 10 p.m. standard required by A CT 1.162 As the FCC prepared
for a full judicial review of the twenty-four-hour prohibition against indecent
broadcasts, the Supreme Court issued a relevant decision in the related area
63
of telephone regulation.1

III. THE PERMISSIBLE LIMITS OF TELEPHONE INDECENCY
REGULATION IN SABLE COMMUNICATIONS OF
CALIFORNIA V. FCC

In Sable Communications of California v. FCC,"M the Supreme Court of
the United States considered the constitutionality of § 223(b) of the Communications Act, 165 which banned indecent and obscene interstate commercial
telephone messages.' 6 6 In Sable, the Court held that although the ban on
obscene interstate telephone messages was lawful,' 67 the ban on indecent
68
speech was nonetheless constitutionally impermissible.'
In Sable, Sable Communications offered sexually oriented pre-recorded
telephone messages, otherwise known as "dial-a-porn."' 6 9 The messages
were accessible to both local and long-distance callers.' 7 Fearing criminal
or civil penalties under the statute, however, the company subsequently filed
161. Id.
162. See Passler, supra note 90, at 148.
163. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). Because of the
factual similarities between the cases, the outcome of Sable had considerable impact upon the
court's decision in ACT II.
164. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
165. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Amended in April 1988, § 223(b) of the Communications
Act prohibits indecent and obscene interstate commercial telephone communications. The
statute in question at the commencement of Sable read:
"(b)(l) Whoever knowingly"(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by
means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device) any obscene or indecent
communication for commercial purposes to any person, regardless of whether the
maker of such communication placed the call; or
"(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for an
activity prohibited by subparagraph (A),
"shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or
both."
Sable, 492 U.S. at 123 n.4 (quoting Pub. L. No. 100-297, 102 Stat. 424 (1988)).
166. Id. at 117.
167. Id. at 124.
168. Id. at 125.
169. Id. at 117-18. See generally Elizabeth J. Mann, Comment, Telephones, Sex, and the
FirstAmendment, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1986).
170. Sable, 492 U.S. at 118.
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suit in district court for declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of § 223.171

Rejecting Sable's argument that the statute "was unconstitutional because
it created a national standard of obscenity,"' 7 2 the district court refused to
issue an injunction against enforcement of the statute's prohibition against
obscene telephone messages. 73 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the
statute's ban on indecent speech was both overbroad and unconstitutional.' 74 Therefore, the court ordered an injunction "prohibiting enforcement of § 223(b) with respect to any communication alleged to be
'indecent.' "75
On June 23, 1989, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the appeals
court's decision 17 6 and upheld the appeals court's injunction against § 223's
ban on indecent telephone messages.' 7 7 The government may constitutionally limit individual freedom of expression; however, it must use the least
restrictive means necessary to achieve the state's articulated compelling interest. 178 In this instance, the Court reasoned that although shielding minors from potentially harmful messages is a compelling state interest, the
regulation was not "designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily
179
interfering with First Amendment freedoms."'
In striking down the statutory ban on indecent telephone messages, the
Court summarily rejected the government's reasoning. 8 ° First, the Court
171. Sable brought the action to protect itself from any criminal investigation, prosecution,
or civil action initiated by either the FCC or Justice Department. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 119.
176. Id. at 115. First, the Court rejected Sable's contention that the statute created an
impermissible national standard for obscenity. Id. at 124. The Court compared § 223 with
federal statutes permissibly prohibiting the mailing of obscene materials. Id. at 124-25; see
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). Additionally, the Court noted that although
Sable Communications might incur substantial costs tailoring their messages to "contemporary community standards," such a burden does not make the statute constitutionally impermissible. The Court suggested means by which Sable Communications could tailor its
messages to meet "contemporary community standards." The Court's suggestions included
the use of operators to screen the locale of incoming calls, or block calls from certain areas.
Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
177. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
178. Id.; see also Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 618-20 (1976); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
179. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (quoting Hynes, 425 U.S. at 620).
180. First, the government argued that Pacifica justified a complete ban on indecent telephone messages. Id. at 127. Second, it contended that there were no alternative means to
prevent children from gaining access to the indecent messages. Id. at 128, The government
claimed "enterprising youngsters" might gain access to the messages. Id. Lastly, the government maintained that Congress, by passing legislation mandating a complete ban on the
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rejected the government's attempt to use Pacifica as justification for a total
ban.'' Pacifica did not involve a total ban on indecent broadcasts.' 8 2 Similarly, "[tihe Court in Pacifica was careful 'to emphasize the narrowness of
[its] holding.' "83 Pacifica, therefore, could not be used to support the government's case in Sable.'8 4 In addition, the Court characterized as "quite
unpersuasive" the government's suggestion that no alternative to a total ban
existed.' 8 5 Pointing to the FCC's own findings, the Court indicated that
personal credit card numbers, access codes, and scrambling rules were satisfactory less restrictive measures.'8 6 Finally, in spurning the government's
suggestion that the Court should defer to Congress, the Supreme Court held
that it was within its legitimate function to determine the constitutionality of
87
the law. 1
Within the Court's rejection of the government's case in Sable was an
implicit expression of disapproval for the FCC's prohibition of broadcast
88 Although Sable's immediate
indecency.'
effect was to make it more diffimessages, had determined that the FCC's rules were insufficient. The government argued that,
in this instance, the Court must defer to Congress. Id. at 129.
181. Id. at 127. The Court also noted that Pacifica relied upon the "uniquely pervasive"
nature of the broadcast medium to justify the levied restrictions. Id. Private commercial telephone messages, however fail to involve a "captive audience." Id. at 128. The messages at
issue in Sable typically will not involve unwilling listeners. Clearly, "[p]lacing a telephone call
is not the same as turning on a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent message...
[D]ial-a-porn service[s] [are] not so invasive or surprising that [they] prevent[] an unwilling
listener from avoiding exposure to it." Id. at 128.
182. Id. at 127.
183. Id. at 128.
184. See Passler, supra note 90, at 155-56.
185. Sable, 492 U.S. at 128.
186. Id.
187. The Court held that "[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry
when First Amendment rights are at stake." Id. at 129.
188. Justice Scalia highlighted the underlying value judgement made by the Court in Sable:
The conclusion of the reasoning in... our opinion is as follows:
"For all we know from this record, the FCC's technological approach to restricting
dial-a-porn messages to adults who seek them would be extremely effective, and only
a few of the most enterprising and disobedient young people would manage to secure
access to such messages. If this is the case, it seems to us that § 223(b) is not a
narrowly tailored effort to serve the compelling interest of preventing minors from
being exposed to indecent telephone messages." We could as well have said:
"We know from this record that the FCC's technological approach to restricting
dial-a-porn messages to adults who seek them would be inadequate, since some enterprising and disobedient young people would manage to secure access to such
messages. Since this is the case, it seems to us that § 223(b) is a narrowly tailored
effort to serve the compelling interest of preventing minors from being exposed to
indecent telephone messages."
Id. at 131-32 (citation omitted).
Thus, Justice Scalia suggests that the Court, in deciding the validity of the statutory prohibition, engaged in a balancing test. In this instance the Court measured the gravity of the
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cult for the government to legitimize a twenty-four-hour ban on indecent
broadcasting, subsequent decisions 8 9 have had the apparent effect of narrowing the Court's holding." 9°
harm to fall upon those few enterprising young persons exposed to the indecent messages and
weighed it against the social utility of allowing those numerous adults and commercial entities
to exercise their constitutionally protected right to receive and transmit indecent speech. See
id. The Justice also noted, however, that:
where a reasonable person draws the line in this balancing process-that is, how few
children render the risk unacceptable-depends in part upon what mere "indecency"
...includes. The more narrow the understanding of what is "obscene," and hence
the more pornographic what is embraced within the residual category of "indecency," the more reasonable it becomes to insist upon greater assurance of insulation
from minors.
Id. at 132.
When applying this analysis to the twenty-four-hour ban on broadcast indecency, the
Court's outcome seems less certain. It would appear that, at least according to Scalia, the
Court must seriously consider the number of children that would be exposed to indecent
broadcasts in spite of the mandated channeling measures as well as the proximity of the speech
considered indecent to that considered obscene.
Scalia's approach is consistent with the nuisance rationale used in Pacifica. See, William J.
Boyce, RestrainingPriorRestraint,or a Callfor Balancing in Evaluating Obscenity Abatement
Statutes: City of Paduch v. Investment Entertainment, Inc., 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 181, 188 n.39
(1987) (citing cases using a similar cost-benefit analysis in fashioning a nuisance remedy).
189. See Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 966 (1992). The effect of Dial was to require those individuals who wish access to
dial-a-porn services to file a written request with their phone company. See id. Following
Sable, Congress amended 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(2)(A) of the Communications Act to prohibit
"any indecent communication for commercial purposes which is available to any person under
18 years of age or to any other person without that person's consent, regardless of whether the
maker of such communication placed the call." Dial, 938 F.2d at 1539. The statute affords a
"safe harbor" exception to those telephone providers that restrict access by requiring that the
subscriber file a written request for access to dial-a-porn services. Id.In Dial, a dial-a-porn
provider sued in federal court charging "that the law requiring written subscriptions would
hurt business and unfairly restrict individual rights." Ruth Marcus, Justices Clear the Way for
'Dial-a-Porn'Shield,WASH. POST,Jan. 28, 1992, at A6. In holding that the regulation passed
constitutional scrutiny, the court first looked to Sable and noted that "[tihe government is
empowered to 'regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling government interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.' " Dial, 938 F.2d at 1541 (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 126). Accordingly, the
court reasoned that in order for Dial to prevail, it must show that there are other less restrictive approaches that are 'just as effective in achieving its goal of denying access by minors to
indecent dial-a-porn messages." Id. (emphasis added). In holding that the district court erred
in ruling that the less restrictive voluntary blocking system was adequately protective, the
court pointed to a study showing that even after voluntary blocking became available in the
New York area, only four percent of the 4.6 million residential telephone lines were blocked.
Id. at 1542. In conclusion, the court noted that "voluntary blocking would not even come
close to eliminating much of the access of children." Id. Further, the court stated "[t]he
means must be effective in achieving the goal .... [In this instance] voluntary blocking ...
clearly is not an effective means." Id.
190. It is unclear from the court's holding in Dial whether the less restrictive means proposed by the regulation's opponents must be "just as effective" as the government's regulation,
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CHALLENGING THE TWENTY-FOUR-HOUR BAN ON INDECENCY:

ACT II

A. Justificationfor a Total Ban on BroadcastIndecency: FCC Concludes
that a Total Ban on BroadcastIndecency is Constitutionally
Permissible
Following the Court's decision in Sable, the FCC asked the circuit court
of appeals for a remand of ACT .191 The remand would permit the agency
to gather a more complete record of relevant data concerning children's
viewing habits and the propriety of indecent broadcasting.' 92 In September
193
1989 the court granted the request.
On remand, the FCC solicited public comment on the twenty-four-hour
ban upon broadcast indecency. 194 Specifically, the agency requested data on
children's access to broadcast sources, their viewing habits, alternative
means of restricting children's access, and the availability of indecent mate19 5
rial for adults in non-broadcast media.
On August 6, 1990, the FCC issued its report, 196 concluding that, under
Sable, the twenty-four-hour-ban on broadcast indecency was constitutionally permissible.' 97 It determined there was a reasonable risk that significant
numbers of children are tuned to broadcasters at all hours. 9 The FCC
id.at 1541, or simply an "effective means" of achieving the government's articulated ends. Id.

at 1542.
191. ACTII, 932 F.2d 1504, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 (1992).

192. Id.
193. Id.All interested parties were to be allowed an opportunity to submit relevant information. Id.
194. Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, Notice
of Inquiry, 4 FCC Rcd. 8358 (1989) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry].
195. Id. at para. 16.
196. Enforcement Report, supra note 35. The FCC received over 92,500 responses. Id. at
para. 1 n.6. Almost 88,000 responses supported a 24-hour prohibition. Id.
197. Id. at para. 2. The FCC stated that the indecency ban "comports with the constitutional standard the Supreme Court enunciated in Sable for the regulation of constitutionally
protected speech." Id.
198. Enforcement Report, supra note 35, at para. 2. In reaching its conclusions the FCC
addressed two critical issues: the pervasiveness and accessibility of the broadcast medium to
children, id. at paras. 34-65, and whether any less restrictive means could accomplish the
government's goal of protecting children from indecent broadcasts. Id. at paras. 69-89.
In addressing the issue of broadcasters' pervasiveness, the FCC examined the statistical data
for both radio and television. The data indicated that over 10% of the radio listening audience
from midnight to 6 a.m. consists of 12-17 year olds. Id. at paras. 39, 49. The data regarding
television demonstrated that the percentage of children aged 12-17 during the late evening
audience is equal to or greater than that of adults. Id. at para. 51.
The FCC, however, failed to squarely address the issue of whether exposure to indecent
broadcasts actually harms children. While both evidence to support and rebut the conclusion
was presented to the agency during the course of their inquiry, id. at para. 17, the FCC stated
that "[i]rrespective of the continuing social science debate ...[a]s a legal matter, it is well
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concluded that "[n]either time channeling nor ratings and warning devices
permits effective parental control... and technologies that may permit control are not currently available." 1 99 The agency also noted that alternative
sources for indecent material were available to consenting adults.' ° Because of these alternatives, the FCC concluded that the twenty-four-hour
prohibition would not result in significant interference with adults wishing to
view or listen to indecent programs. 20 1
B.

ACT II: Twenty-Four Hour Ban on Indecent Broadcasts Rejected

In ACT II, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia followed the reasoning of the ACT I court and unanimously invalidated
the FCC's congressionally mandated rule banning indecent broadcasts on a
24-hour basis.2 °2 In reviewing the agency's order, the court found merit in
the petitioners' constitutional attack upon the ban.20 a The court, however,
rejected the petitioners' contention that the FCC's definition of indecency
was both vague and overbroad. 2°4
The court in A CT II only briefly revisited the issue of vagueness and overbreadth.20 5 Using reasoning similar to that in ACT I, the court concluded
established that exposure of children to such material may be harmful, even if that effect has
not been completely proven scientifically." Id. at para. 18; see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 642 (1967) (" '[w]hile these studies all agree that a causal link has not been demonstrated, they are equally agreed that a causal link has not been disproved either.' We do not
demand of legislatures 6scientifically certain criteria of legislation.' ") (quoting Magrath, The
Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 7, 52).
199. See Enforcement Report, supra note 35, at para. 2. Addressing the issue of whether
the twenty-four-hour-ban was tailored in a sufficiently narrow manner to survive constitutional
scrutiny, the FCC examined the effectiveness of the previous time-channeling enforcement policy, id. at paras. 70-75, ratings or warnings, id. at paras. 76-79, and other technological methods for limiting children's access to indecent broadcasts, id. at paras. 80.83. The agency
concluded time-channeling and warnings were flawed because they relied on parental supervision. Id. at paras. 70, 79. Additionally, ratings and warnings were considered ineffective because listeners often "graze" stations. Id. at para. 79. This random tuning behavior, the
agency determined, would likely render ineffective any warnings. Id. Lastly, the FCC concluded that no current technology could restrict children's access to indecent broadcast programming. Id. at 80.
200. Enforcement Report, supra note 35, at paras. 84, 86.
201. Id. at para. 92 (concluding that "[a]dults . . . have other [non-broadcast] means to
access such [indecent] material should they so desire"); id. at 86. Such access includes the
media of cable television, id. at para. 84, satellite programming, id. at para. 87, books,
magazines, and video or audio cassettes, id. at para. 88.
202. ACTII, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 (1992). The
court's decision was unanimous. Judges Mikva, Edwards, and now Supreme Court Justice
Thomas heard the case.
203. Id. at 1508-09.
204. Id. at 1508.
205. See id.
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the issue was resolved in Pacifica.206 As before, the court rejected the legitimacy of either argument.2 °7
In renouncing the total ban on broadcast indecency, the court found that
the ban did not pass strict scrutiny.2 °s Moreover, the fact that Congress
itself mandated the ban did not affect the court's view that such a prohibition could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.2 "9
Addressing the developments since the court's decision in ACT I, the
court noted that nothing had reduced the "precedential force" of its prior
decision.2 10 In sum, the court held that neither the FCC's ban on indecent
broadcast material, nor the congressional mandate could pass "constitutional muster."2 1 The court subsequently remanded the proceeding to the
FCC, directing the agency to resume its plan to redetermine the times during
which indecent material may be broadcast.2 12 Despite the government's request, the Supreme Court voted 6-2 not to rehear the case.21 3
206. Id. The court stated that it had "already considered and rejected a vagueness challenge to the Commission's definition of indecency. In ACT I, we noted that the Supreme
In our view, the Supreme Court's
Court, entertain[ed] a similar challenge in Pacifica....
decision in Pacifica dispelled any vagueness concerns attending the definition." Id. (citing
ACTI, 852 F.2d 1332, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1988), vacated, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1509 (failing to provide further reasoning other than to state that "neither the
Commission's action prohibiting the broadcast of indecent material, nor the congressional
mandate that prompted it, can pass constitutional muster under the law of this circuit").
209. Id. at 1505.
210. Id.at 1509.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1510. The court stated, "[o]ur decision today effectively returns the Commission to the position it briefly occupied after ACTI and prior to congressional adoption of the
appropriations rider." Id. The court directed the FCC to specifically consider "the appropriate definitions of 'children' and 'reasonable risk' for channeling purposes, the paucity of station- or program-specific audience data . . . and the scope of the government's interest in
regulating indecent broadcasts." Id.
213. Children's Legal Found. v. Action for Children's Television, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 (1992).
While the justices failed to indicate their reasons for denying certiorari, the arguments advanced by the respondents were largely procedural. See Brief for the Respondents, Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), reply to petition for cert.filed,
(U.S. Dec. 16, 1991) (U.S. Nos. 91-833, 91-952), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 (1992). The
respondents, in arguing that the Court has no basis for granting certiorari, note that the ban
was previously endorsed by seven individual judges without any dissent, id. at 12, that there is
no conflict among the circuits, id. at 12, 14, that a grant of certiorari would "be undesirable"
because of the likelihood that Justice Thomas would be unable to review this case due to his
earlier participation in the appeals court's decision, id. at 19 n.38, that certiorari is inappropriate to determine if the lower court reached a proper result on the facts, id at 17, and also,
because the appeals court remanded the case to the FCC for further proceedings, the matter
lacks finality, id. at 12, 18-19. The court's denial of certiorari, however, has no precedential
value. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 366 n.1 (1973).
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V.

ANALYSIS:

ACT II's FLAWED

REASONING

The court in ACT II failed to undertake a proper appraisal of the constitutionality of the FCC's broadcast indecency regulation. The court, in an
opinion almost devoid of analysis, reached a foregone conclusion without
addressing factual circumstances which should have been considered.21 4
The Court in ACT II relied too heavily upon the court's previous analysis
and factual conclusions in A CT I and thereby compromised the validity of
its conclusions. 215
A. Factual Deficiencies
The court in ACT II fails to consider the unique role of broadcasters as a
public trustee2 16 as well as the medium's pervasive presence in society.2 17
Additionally, ACT II fails to address the significant factual record compiled
by the FCC and mandated by the court following ACT P.2"8 This record
evinces both the broadcasters' significant influence among young children
2 9
and the harmful effects of their exposure to indecent broadcasting.
Thirdly, A CT II fails to consider adequately the state's compelling interest
in protecting the privacy of the home. 220 First recognized in Pacifica, an
individual's right to privacy and to be left alone outweigh the First Amendment concerns of an intruder. 22 ' The privacy challenge was not at issue
before the ACT I court; 222 therefore, in adopting the court's analysis in ACT
I, the ACT II court failed to consider this issue. 223 Finally, the court failed
to distinguish radio and television from dial-a-porn or magazines.22 4 Radio
and television, unlike other media, may, without any prior warning as to the
214. In holding that "nothing else in the intervening thirty-four months" reduced the force
of its holding in ACT I, the court evidences its failure to address certain relevant factual considerations. ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1509.
215. Id. at 1508 (stating that "circuit precedent [ACT I] compels our rejection today of a
total ban on the broadcast of indecent material").
216. See supra notes 9, 87 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 9, 88 and accompanying text. Not only is broadcasting pervasive, it,
unlike dial-a-porn, or indecent magazines, is "uniquely accessible to children, even those too
young to read." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978).
218. See ACT II, 932 F.2d 1504 (1991).
219. See supra notes 193-213 and accompanying text.
220. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932
F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), petition for cert.filed, (U.S. Dec. 16, 1991) (No. 91-952) [hereinafter Cert. Petition], cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281-82 (1992).
221. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
222. See ACT H, 932 F.2d at 1505.
223. Compare ACT 1, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) with ACT II, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (ignoring the privacy issue in the later case).
224. See ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1509 (relying on Sable's total ban on indecent commercial
telephone messages to illustrate "the strict constitutional standard that government efforts to
regulate the content of speech must satisfy").
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program's content, 22 5 inadvertently expose an audience member to a potentially offensive or harmful message. 226 By failing to recognize that broadcasters operate within a uniquely regulated medium, the court ignores
Supreme Court precedent holding that broadcasters are subject to "restric227
tions on indecent speech that might be impermissible for other media."
In sum, these four factual omissions prevented the A CT II court from conducting an appropriate legal analysis.
B.

Analytical Inadequaciesand InappropriateConclusions

The A CT cases are unique because they involve a direct conflict between a
compelling state interest and a fundamental constitutional right. 22 8 In such
instances, the government may serve its interest, but it must do so through
narrowly drawn regulations in which the means are carefully tailored to
achieve the articulated ends. 229 Since both A CT I and A CT II recognize the
state's compelling interest in protecting children from indecent speech, the
central issue in both cases revolves around the degree of precision to which
the state's regulation must be tailored. 230 According to Sable, these regulations are permissible if they are the "least restrictive means [necessary] to
23 1
further the articulated interest.
The court in A CT II first should have thoroughly considered both the
nature and weight of the state's compelling interests. The court failed to
weigh the state's additional fundamental concern with privacy, 232 the new
evidence of children's exposure to broadcasters at all hours,2 33 and the de225. See Cert. Petition, supra note 220, at 11-12.
226. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989). While the
individual receiving the broadcast may turn the receiver off, the individual nonetheless does
not avoid the initial effects of the offensive programming. Similarly, in the instance of children, they may, of course, not choose to end the transmission.
227. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984) (stating that "the
broadcasting industry plainly operates under restraints not imposed upon other media"); New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (stating that the Court's opinion in Pacifica justified
special treatment of indecent broadcasting because the exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 n.8 (1981) (plurality opinion) (noting that the uniqueness of each
medium of expression, including broadcasting, requires standards suited for it).
228. See generally ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (involving a conflict between the
state's compelling interest in children and the fundamental right of free speech); ACT I, 932
F.2d at 1504 (involving a conflict between the state's compelling interest in children and the
fundamental right of free speech).
229. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
230. See, e.g., ACT H, 932 F.2d at 1506.
231. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
232. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
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gree of harm incurred by children exposed to indecent broadcasts.2 34 If the
court had examined these issues, it would have found the government's interests more compelling than it previously did in ACT I. Second, the court
should have weighed the relative effectiveness of channeling against the effectiveness of a total ban. 2" 5 Doing so would clearly show that a total ban is
more effective. Third, the court should have considered the fact that broadcasting is a unique forum in which speech may be regulated to a greater
extent than other media. 236 Lastly, the court should have balanced the utility of the government's aforementioned compelling interests against the re2 37
Of
sultant infringement upon the fundamental right to free speech.
course, a problem remains as to how to balance these interests. The
Supreme Court has noted that "where a reasonable person draws the line in
this balancing process-that is, how few children render the [infringement
upon fundamental rights] unacceptable-" depends upon the degree of harm
evidenced.2 38 Indeed, according to Justice Scalia such a process necessarily
involves "value judgement[s]. 2 39 In this case, it is sufficient to conclude
that under an appropriate analysis, the courts or Congress should acknowledge the constitutional permissibility of greater restrictions upon the broadcast of indecent programming.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Freedom of expression is a fundamental right protected by the First
Amendment to the Constitution. Children's interests, however, remain
compelling to both parents and the government. It becomes a difficult,
value-laden task when courts must arbitrate a conflict between the two.
In Actio, for Children's Television v. FCC, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit directed the FCC to cease enforcement of a congressionally mandated twenty-four-hour ban on indecent broadcasts. In
holding that the ban was unconstitutional, the court failed to properly consider critical factual considerations. These omissions prevented the court
from accurately weighing the state's compelling interest within a uniquely
regulated medium. The court in ACT II, therefore, inappropriately reached
its conclusion that the FCC's ban was not the least restrictive means necessary to achieve the government's compelling interests. Under an appropriate
analysis, a total ban likely remains unconstitutional, however, the weight of
234. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 188 an accompanying text.
236. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
238. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 132 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see supra note 188.
239. Sable, 492 U.S. at 131 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the government's compelling interests and the unique nature of the broadcast medium permits the FCC to constitutionally further constrict the current "safe harbor" for indecent broadcasts.
William Banks Wilhelm, Jr.

